Sidebar: Risk? What Risk?
Very few people ever worry about security issues when
they send electronic
mail (at the user level, not to be confused with the
transport-level
security issues). E-mail is a tool, like an editor,
what could be
insecure about it? Actually, unwitting offsite forwarding,
obsolete
user-id's and aliases, and ambiguous user names all
create subtle
security liabilities.
To illustrate the hazards of offsite forwarding, I'll
relate the story
of a department head who traveled back and forth between
two institutions,
a company site and a university, and did work for both.
He forwarded
his mail to the appropriate site wherever he happened
to be.
One day, someone within the company sent company-confidential
material
to all the department heads. You can imagine her chagrin
when this
sensitive mail triggered a Mailer-Daemon message (returned
mail notifying
you that your message was undeliverable) from a computer
system halfway
across the country! This material wasn't even supposed
to go outside
the company!
It turned out that the traveling department head had
forwarded his
mail, as usual, but this time the university machine
where his mail
was kept had a full disk and no place to put new messages,
so the
message was returned to the sender.
Unfortunately, the sender didn't realize she was sending
this confidential
material outside the company until she received the
Daemon message.
She had used an alias which was supposed to contain
only accounts
within the company. Through no fault (nor knowledge)
of her own, she
had sent confidential material outside of her company
and outside
the ability of her company to protect it. Of course,
the fault lies
in allowing someone to forward their mail outside the
company. Although
such forwarding at first seems reasonable and desirable,
especially
in a case such as this, it turns out to have potential
for disaster.
Some will argue that as long as the intended recipient
still receives
the message, then security has not been breached. But
most network
sites backup their mail directories regularly. Thus,
if a site has
handled the message, it likely also has the message
on a backup tape.
More ominously, e-mail can be intercepted by a network
listener, or
copied through other means. My point is that you should
not rely on
the hope that no one will chance upon sensitive material;
instead
you should not allow such information to exist anywhere
outside of
your control.
Obsolete user-ids also create potential problems. Sometimes
there
are seemingly defensible reasons for keeping such accounts
active:
perhaps the original user has left the company, but
the files will
be used by others in the same group. More often such
accounts remain
active simply because there is no formal procedure for
removing obsolete
accounts. In either case, a user on the local network
might send the
former employee mail expecting an action to be taken
upon its receipt,
not realizing the user has departed. While this isn't
a security breach,
as such, undesirable results might occur that could
have been prevented.
Ambiguous addresses can be a more direct security issue.
If you send
a message to "smith," do you know it's reaching
the correct
person? What happens if that company-confidential message
intended
for department heads winds up being delivered to a contractor
or a
new employee with no business having it?
All of these problems can be effectively addressed with
a slightly
restrictive policy and a shell script like rts that
notifies
someone of a new or more accurate address for a user.
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